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Abstract—Firewall configuration is critical, yet often conducted
manually with inevitable errors, leaving networks vulnerable to
cyber attack [40]. The impact of misconfigured firewalls can
be catastrophic in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) networks. These networks control the distributed assets
of industrial systems such as power generation and water
distribution systems. Automation can make designing firewall
configurations less tedious and their deployment more reliable.
In this paper, we propose ForestFirewalls, a high-level ap-
proach to configuring SCADA firewalls. Our goals are three-
fold. We aim to: first, decouple implementation details from
security policy design by abstracting the former; second, simplify
policy design; and third, provide automated checks, pre and post-
deployment, to guarantee configuration accuracy. We achieve
these goals by automating the implementation of a policy to a
network and by auto-validating each stage of the configuration
process. We test our approach on a real SCADA network to
demonstrate its effectiveness.
Index Terms—firewall auto-configuration, SCADA network
security, security policy, policy verification, Zone-Conduit model.
I. INTRODUCTION
“The single most important factor of your firewall’s
security is how you configure it.”
Rubin and Greer [36]
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) net-
works control the distributed assets of many industrial systems.
Power generation and water distribution are just two examples
that illustrate the critical nature of these networks. Others in-
clude factory automation, sewage management, airport control
systems and chemical plant control.
SCADA networks are not like corporate IT networks [38].
IT networks can accept a degree of reliability orders of
magnitude lower than the network controlling a power station.
A fault in the latter will cost serious money, if not lives.
At the same time, SCADA networks often incorporate
highly vulnerable devices. The Programmable Logic Con-
trollers (PLCs) that control physical devices such as gas valves
have highly constrained memory and computational power.
Today, they often include network functionality such as a
TCP/IP stack, but exclude sophisticated security functionality.
Despite their name, PLCs are not user programmable. The
plant operator does not program them – that requires a pro-
gramming board that pushes low-level code into an EPROM.
The devices come pre-installed with code (and security holes).
There are many PLCs in a power station, along with similar
devices providing telemetry, and their upgrade is likely to
occur only during a major overhaul of a plant, which might
happen once in a decade (if that often).
These devices would be vulnerable if exposed to the Inter-
net, and a plant operator cannot fix the vulnerabilities. Air gaps
have been proposed as a solution to protect these devices, but
an air gap is no longer a feasible approach for many reasons.
In fact, Byres calls the idea a myth [8] to emphasise how poor
a solution it is. The only viable protection today is a firewall,
or series of firewalls [9], [38].
As Rubin and Greer note [36], it is, therefore, vital that
these firewalls are configured correctly. Misconfiguration of
SCADA firewalls can lead to security breaches, resulting in
significant physical and environmental damage, financial loss
or worse, the loss of human lives. A recent example is the
hacking of a German steel mill by cyber attackers in 2014
that destroyed its blast furnace [4].
Unfortunately, firewall configuration, in practice, is a com-
plicated and repetitive manual task. It involves training in
proprietary and device-specific configuration languages, and
long and complex device configurations. Lack of automation
tools to assist this task has resulted in unoptimised, error-prone
configurations [35], [40], [41].
The problem is exacerbated in SCADA plants where in-
dustrial engineers generally lack specialised networking and
security knowledge. Such knowledge is often brought in
through third party contractors. These IT security specialists
are usually unfamiliar with the specific requirements of indus-
trial engineering, and are on-site only for brief periods.
A cost-effective alternative to training plant engineers to
become IT specialists is to build network operations tools
that derive firewall configurations from high-level policy. Ap-
proaches using SDN have been proposed [25], [37], but they
remain a distant reality for SCADA networks, where TCP
is still a recent innovation. And power plants are insecure
now [35]! SCADA networks need a solution that works now,
using off-the-shelf technology. In this paper, we propose such
a solution: ForestFirewalls.
Our system provides a mechanism for specification of
security policy at a level a non-IT specialist could understand.
What’s more, it forces good designs on its users through
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principles derived from the study of real SCADA firewall
configurations [35] and International Society for Automation
(ISA) best practices [2], [7], [38]. Most notably:
• Single source of truth: more specifically, “Security man-
agers need a single place to look for the corporate policies
on who gets in and who doesn’t.” [20]. This general
principle in computer science [5] applies doubly here.
• Simplify: we don’t try to provide every possible security
feature. At best, advanced features create confusion, and at
worst, bad implementations can create security flaws.
• Verify everything again and again: there is a clear danger
in assuming any one piece of software functions correctly,
from the firewall up to and including our own system. We
check the configuration works at every level possible.
• No implicit rules: implicit rules allow unexpected inter-
actions, and undesirable consequences [35]. Desired flows
must be explicitly allowed.
• Rule order should not matter: it should be possible to add,
or subtract a policy rule without considering its effect on
every other rule. Surprisingly, none of the existing firewall
configuration platforms [11], [13], [14], [23] achieved this.
Operators using these tools, must provide correct rules and
maintain correct rule order to avoid adverse interactions.
• Separate structure from function [30]: decoupling
network topology (i.e., structure) from policy specification
(i.e., function) facilitates high-level requirements based poli-
cies without network-centric minutiae like IP addresses.
• Convenience: security and convenience are usually at odds,
but wherever possible convenience should be provided. This
is not a luxury – lack of convenience is one of the main
reasons operators circumvent their own security.
Our system comprises a suite of tools to write policy,
validate, test configurations, and create real configurations, and
is designed to be user extensible.
We demonstrate it with a real example, derived from the ac-
tual (but anonymised) firewall configurations of a real SCADA
plant. The example is intentionally small for clarity, but it
shows a core set of functionality. The example includes several
zones, two firewalls, and multiple real services much as they
would run in the real network. Our testbed uses two different
firewalls: one Cisco and one Linux-based, in order to show
both the device independent nature of our policy language,
and that heterogeneous network devices can be configured in
the same network. The network offers multiple services: DNS,
HTTP, ... etc., and we use test traffic on the network to show
correct function.
The proof of the pudding is that we can specify this net-
work’s policy in only 80 Lines of Code (LoC), to generate the
equivalent of 2720 device-level LoC found in a real SCADA
case study [35]. This order of magnitude reduction, along with
rigorous validation, shows the value of ForestFirewalls.
II. RELATED WORK
A useful firewall configuration platform should allow poli-
cies to be specified abstractly, flexibly enough and in detail.
There are many products and security management tools with
varying levels of sophistication introduced by firewall vendors
[11], [13], [14], [23], but policies still cannot be specified using
high-level requirements.
For example, Cisco introduced security levels for quick and
easy access between internal and external firewall interfaces
[13], but these cannot specify detailed traffic restrictions.
Hence, Access Control Lists (ACLs) are required to supple-
ment these levels. Security levels may also not map to clear se-
curity policies. This hinders firewall auto-configuration, which
needs clear policies [5] to permit traffic.
High-level security polices need to be based on security
abstractions. The choice of the abstraction determines the
level of decoupling between network topology and security
policy. For one, Firmato [3] uses a role-based abstraction in its
network grouping language that is independent of the firewalls
and routers used in the network. But, the abstraction does not
intuitively map policy to topology and requires minutiae like
IP addresses to be input through the policy specification, to
implement policy on a network instance.
For another, Cisco has introduced security policy manage-
ment tools (e.g., VNMC for VSG policy management) to cater
for complexities introduced in network virtualisation [15]. For
scalability, the tools allow operating systems (i.e., VMs) to be
allocated to zones and policies to be defined per zone. But,
each VM still needs to be defined using minutiae like host-
names. ForestFirewalls decouples policy from topology using
a more intuitive Zone-Conduit abstraction. The direct zone-
to-network mapping allows policy to exclude IP addresses or
hostnames as input.
The ability to debug configuration errors is also a highly
desirable feature in a firewall configuration platform. But, this
debugging should support abstract queries, free of network
centric minutiae. Fang [29] and Lumeta [39] are interactive
tools that facilitate firewall rule debugging, but the queries
they support use network-centric minutiae as input.
Also desirable would be if the configuration platform
supported more general-purpose abstract queries like service
reachability and traffic isolation queries. Network program-
ming languages supporting such queries have been proposed
(e.g., NetKAT [1]), but they too, rely on minutiae as input;
and are not specifically aimed at configuring firewalls.
Ability to create and correctly compose distributed poli-
cies is also necessary in a firewall configuration platform.
Doing so, allows users from multiple policy sub-domains
(e.g., SCADA engineers, Corporate admins) to manage their
own policies. Policy Graph Abstraction (PGA) [32] provides
such a framework for SDN networks, Cloud infrastructure and
Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) environments. It can
automatically compose distributed policies into a coherent,
conflict-free policy set. But, PGA leaves out how logs, alerts
and alarms (i.e., reports) should be enabled in security-critical
middle boxes like firewalls. These reports are critical to detect
misconfigurations and network security setup failures. Our
solution allows reports to be encapsulated with security policy
via a framework designed by us.
Additionally, it is essential in SCADA networks to have
assurance of expected configuration behaviour prior to de-
ployment, since downtime must be minimised. SANE [10]
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proposes a central Domain Controller with trusted privileges to
reduce end-host initiated attacks in corporate networks. It sup-
ports topology-independent high-level declarative policies but
provides no pre-deployment guarantee of correct configuration
behaviour. ForestFirewalls uses simple automated emulations
to achieve this goal.
Most related works do not propose a high-level descrip-
tion that intuitively decouples policy from topology. In some
cases [3], topology needs to be explicitly mapped to policy
through the specification per host/subnet basis. There is also
no automated pre- and post-deployment verification of poli-
cies. Moreover, none of the above works examine SCADA
networks, with unique security requirements and best practices
compared to Corporate networks.
The prior work also does not address a key practical issue-
complexity. Firewall vendors have concentrated on new and
impressive features to create systems with as much or more
complexity as the base firewall configurations.
Our research tackles this problem head-on. Our solution,
ForestFirewalls, uses security abstractions to drastically reduce
firewall policy specification complexity. These abstractions
decouple policy from topology intuitively, so firewall policies
can be described using high-level requirements independent
of vendor and network intricacies. Automated verification
is also built-in to our system to mitigate misconfigurations.
ForestFirewalls also provides a formalism to compose rule
sets into a coherent, conflict-free policy set. These features
collectively, make firewall configuration a commodity skill
rather than a specialisation, so business managers and plant
engineers alike can manage their SCADA firewalls.
III. REQUIREMENTS
Bush and Bellovin [5] identified the following core require-
ments of an automated security configuration system:
• Clear policies: an automated system cannot resolve be-
tween a plausible and a correct policy [5]. For example,
between allowing HTTP access to a publicly shared Web
server or to a sensitive internal Web server. So the policy
must be clearly understood by a Manager.
• Database driven: all device configurations and their
changes must be recorded in a single reference point [5],
which allows fast response to security incidents as well as
accurate security audits.
• Meta-configurations: specifications or instructions
about real configurations need to be obtained by abstraction
and parameterisation.
However, there are extra issues not described by [5]. For one,
there is an assumption that the auto-configuration system gen-
erating the configurations is correct. But proof of correctness
must stem from validation, as we describe next.
A. Policy verification
SCADA operators need assurance that the device configu-
rations generated produce the expected security outcome, both
pre- and post-deployment. We use multiple verification stages
(1) to provide this assurance.
Fig. 1: Policy verification tiers.
Upper verification tier: it is important initially to check a
specified firewall policy against available industry best prac-
tices [9], [38]. These automated compliancy tests are critical in
SCADA networks where more restrictive practices are required
to minimise their vulnerability to threats from less secure
networks (e.g., the Internet). Best practice violations can be
accurately identified by conducting equivalence and inclusion
checks on the canonicalised policies. See VII.
Complex firewall policies also produce unintended conse-
quences through rule overlaps [27], [42]. So it is additionally
necessary to check policies from high-level through firewall-
level for inconsistencies. We do so accurately, using a mathe-
matical and logic based formal tool: Alloy [21].
Middle verification tier: the second stage helps debug configu-
ration problems prior to deployment. Network emulation offers
a cost effective method to test configurations before actual
deployment [24]. The Netkit open source software package
[31] provides such an emulation platform with virtual devices
and interconnections via User Mode Linux (UML). Automated
pathological traffic tests, together with Netkit emulations, can
verify that the generated configurations produce the expected
outcome prior to deployment.
Lower verification tier: the final stage guarantees that the real
firewalls operate as intended, post deployment. The automated
tests are extended from emulations to the real network, to gen-
erate live-traffic and reveal unexpected configuration behaviour
in the real firewalls.
Automated verification can drastically reduce the number of
firewall misconfigurations. It can be used to identify best-
practice violations and adverse policy interactions, and pre-
vent those from propagating to the physical firewalls. Most
importantly, it provides users with a guarantee of the security
outcome prior to implementation.
B. Firewall reporting
A second issue not described by [5], but key to autoconfig-
uration, is the need to be able to constantly examine the status
of security provided by the firewalls in a network. We discuss
this briefly here to keep within the scope of this paper – see
[33] for an extended discussion.
Firewall security status can be monitored using the diverse
logs, alerts and alarms available. We refer to these together
as firewall reports. These reports are critical in identifying
firewall misconfigurations and detecting failures in the net-
work security setup. But, the industry standards available for
reporting and analysing firewall data are scant and vague. So,
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we developed a firewall reporting framework [33] considering
the granularity and scope requirements of the various reporting
use cases.
We learnt key lessons, in developing this reporting frame-
work. For one, a firewall is a poor source of data in some
reporting use cases (e.g., accounting) [33], although they are
often used in this way. In those cases, it is better to report
elsewhere in the network and release a firewall’s resources for
its primary function: traffic filtering. Where firewall reporting
must be enabled, it needs to be at the correct granularity.
Employing an inferior granularity prevents collecting suffi-
cient data to satisfy use-case requirements, using an overly-fine
granularity simply wastes resources.
Additionally, security policy and reporting policy need to
be encapsulated (i.e., coupled) together [33]. Decoupling the
two can lead to bad decisions, for instance, it would allow
adding security policies that are not verified.
C. Decouple policy from network
A third issue not described by [5], but key to autocon-
figuration, is the need to decouple policy from the network
implementation.
In practice, network architects and business managers de-
cide what type of services are allowed through firewalls.
Network engineers then implement these policies. Intuitively,
separation of the network intricacies from policy specification
better suits these distinct phases. Conceptually this is analo-
gous to the separation of architects and building contractors in
construction. Contractors don’t usually decide what roof shape
a building should have.
Network topology can change often in response to new
business needs, upgrades and service demands. This may alter
the devices and administratively assigned parameters such as
IP addresses and hostnames in the network.
Comparatively, security policies are static. These policies
commonly only involve dozens of distinct services [35], so
policy complexity is relatively low to that of the network. This
relative simplicity and invariant nature leads to decoupling
policy from the network. The adage “Structure and function
should be independent” [30] truly applies here.
Decoupling structure from function, has these advantages:
• Policy is specifiable via high-level, vendor neutral1 re-
quirements: which assists management-level policy makers
not fluent in network-centric details.
• It centralises policy management and promotes reuse:
a single topology-independent organisation policy (i.e.,
source of truth) can be maintained across sites.
• It streamlines network changes and upgrades: the policy
can be quickly re-mapped to a new topology, retaining
previous levels of protection.
• It simplifies best-practice enforcement: best practice stan-
dards can be precisely specified in absence of proprietary
details of specific networks.
Security abstractions are key to decoupling policy from the
underlying network.
1Vendor platform and device independent requirements.
IV. SECURITY ABSTRACTIONS
A good high-level security abstraction captures the under-
lying network security concepts naturally and concisely. For
one, in real networks, we might group systems with a similar
set of traffic services enabled. For another, traffic restrictions
between two systems may be enforced by a single or a series
of firewalls. A good abstraction should decouple what is
restricted between systems from how it is restricted.
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/ ISA
introduce the Zone-Conduit abstraction to segment and isolate
the sub-systems in a control system [2]. But, the Zone-
Conduit model in its original specification is too flexible for
automation. To increase its precision, we needed to add several
extensions [35]. We describe our modified version here.
A. Our modifications to the ISA model
The Zone-Conduit model is a graph G = (Z,C) where Z
is the set of zones, and C ⊂ Z × Z is the set of conduits.
A zone is a logical or physical grouping of an organisation’s
systems with similar security requirements, based on criticality
and consequence [2]. By grouping systems in this manner,
a single zone-policy can be defined for all members of a
zone. For example, 3 disjoint security zones can be defined
to accommodate low, medium and high-risk systems, with
each device assigned to its respective zone, based on their
security level needed. A low-risk system can be accommodated
within a medium or high security zone without compromising
security, but not vice versa.
A conduit provides the secure communication path between
two zones, enforcing the policy between them [2]. Security
mitigation mechanisms (e.g., firewalls) are implemented within
a conduit. A conduit could consist of multiple links and
firewalls, but logically is a single connector. Conduits abstract
how a policy is enforced, so we can focus on what needs to
be enforced.
We conducted real SCADA firewall configuration case stud-
ies [35] and found that the ISA Zone-Conduit model in its
original specification is too flexible for automation. For one,
the ISA model allows alternate ways of defining zones and
conduits to cater for business models. It loosely permits 1:n
or n:1 mapping between conduits, firewalls and policy.
We refine the model through several extensions [35]. First,
we enforce a 1:1 mapping between policies and conduits.
Second, dedicated Firewall-Zones are used to capture firewall
management policies. Third, Abstract-Zones are used to cap-
ture the distinct policy requirements of serial firewalls. Carrier-
Zones are also used to abstract any carrier based transit outside
of an administrative domain’s control.
The ISA standard also loosely allows sub-zones to be
defined, enabling multiple policies within a zone. Doing so,
implies that selected subsystems in a zone (e.g., a server) could
have their own separate policies. Allowing exceptions would
impart a false sense of security: these systems are only as
secure as the zone itself, in the absence of firewalls enforcing
a real separation. We tighten the specification further in our
approach by strictly enforcing a single zone-policy.
A single zone-policy leads to every device within a zone
having the same set of permissions to initiate, accept or block
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one or more services. Hence, a zone is the smallest unit of
abstraction for which a policy can be applied to and we do
so simply and unambiguously using inter-zone flows.
Once extended, the best practice produces a tight specification
suitable for auto-configuration. We can now begin to formally
define firewall security policies based on this refined Zone-
Conduit model.
B. Policy on a single conduit
A conduit policy in the refined Zone-Conduit model can
be constructed from an ordered set of rules [p1, p2, ..., pn]
that act on packet sequences to accept, deny, or in some
cases, modify them. Particularly, a policy rule p1 operates
on A = {atomic packet sequences}, where an atomic
packet sequence is a complete packet sequence that cannot be
decomposed into smaller subsequences (except themselves and
the null sequence- φ). Complete means that a decision on two
concatenated complete subsequences is the same as that on the
joint sequence, i.e., p1(s1+s2) = p1(s1)+p1(s2),∀s1, s2 ∈ A,
where + is an associative concatenation operator. A is closed
under + and φ is the identity. So, A is a monoid and policy
rules p(·) are monoid endomorphisms on A (i.e., mappings
from A to itself that preserve the semigroup structure of the
operator + and identity φ).
Typical policy rules accept/deny packets, i.e., for A ∈ A
pA(s) =
{
s, if s ∈ A, // accept
φ, if s ∈ Ac, // deny. (1)
This type of rule doesn’t allow modification or creation of
packets. Real firewall rules can modify or create packets. For
instance a firewall might
• update certain header fields related to QoS; or
• might defragment, or fragment packets; or
• be integrated with Network Address Translation (NAT) or
Virtual Private Network (VPN) functionality.
The scope for packet modification is huge, but within a
firewall, many modifications don’t change fields that would
affect further rules in subsequent firewalls, e.g., QoS or TTL
changes. In order to have a tractable problem, we restrict the
firewall rules to such modifications, and thus consider all rules
to be in the form given in 1.
We also cannot construct a policy rule for any possible
subset of A, due to the limitations of technology used in a
firewall. The subsets of A for which rules can be defined is
actually a sigma algebra σ(A) [6].
The particular sigma algebra will be generated by the finest
possible partition of A determined by the firewall technology
used. So for a given firewall technology, A can be broken into
sets Ai ⊂ A such that Ai ∩ Aj = {} and ∪iAi = A, and we
can implement rules pAi , but cannot define any rule pB where
B is a strict subset of some Ai.
Firewall rules in practice however, are implemented by
specifying a predicate and an action. A firewall enforces
actions based on predicate matching, and firewall policies
found in practice are built using multiple policy rules [35].
C. Positive, explicit policies
A firewall policy in practice, is made up of multiple
predicate matching rules that can be combined using several
strategies: first match, last match or all match. If we presume
here the conservative security option: an implicit deny- all
rule in place, then an accept rule qam (where m is the predicate)
defines accept packet set A = {s ∈ A | s ≺ m}, where s ≺ m
denotes s matches m. A single deny rule qdm has no affect,
i.e., A = {}.
When we combine two (ordered) rules (qtm1 , q
t
m2) where
t ∈ {a, d}, we define operators based on the matching order:
1) first match
qtm1  qtm2 =

qtm1 , if s ≺ m1
qtm2 , if s ≺ m2 and s 6≺ m1
deny, otherwise,
2) last match
qtm1 	 qtm2 =

qtm2 , if s ≺ m2
qtm1 , if s ≺ m1 and s 6≺ m2
deny, otherwise.
Clearly the operations  and 	 are associative, e.g., (q1 
q2) q3 = q1 (q2 q3), but not commutative or equivalent.
This is a problem. We need a policy to hold the same
semantics regardless of how the rules are ordered, in order
to simplify policy specification.
So, we restrict ourselves to accept rules, conditional
on an implicit deny-all rule. This restriction
• is rich enough to represent all rules [34] and
• the operators are then commutative and equivalent [34].
Equivalent results also hold if we only allow deny rules, but
this option is less secure as it is easier to accidentally leave
something out of a deny list than to include it.
Therefore, we adopt a security whitelisting model, i.e., we
restrict inter-zone flows to express positive abilities2 and deny
all flows that are not explicitly allowed. Doing so, renders
the rule order irrelevant in a policy. A policy now holds the
same semantics, irrespective of how its rules are organised.
Hence, policy makers need not consider the order when adding
or removing policy rules. By being explicit, we also prevent
services being accidentally enabled implicitly.
We can use the conduit-policy definition to also check for
equivalence as well as inclusion of policies [34]. In VII we will
demonstrate how doing enables evaluation of actual firewall
policies against industry best practices for violations.
So far, we considered policy rules on a single conduit. We now
generalise these policies to a network, or rather the simplified
Zone-Conduit model of the network.
D. Network policy
For policy space Φ = {p : A → A |
p is a monoid endomorphism}, we can define a network pol-
icy as
2Refers to the ability to initiate or accept a traffic service.
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Definition 1 (Network Policy). A network policy P = (G,P )
means a Zone-Conduit graph G(Z,C) with policy functions
pij ∈ Φ for (i, j) ∈ C.
When comparing network policies, it is also useful to
partition the policies on the networks (e.g., pij in Definition
1) into equivalence classes [34]. We refer to these partitions
as Semantic Partitions (SPs) as they have the same meaning.
E. Isolation of traffic
An important element in architecting a network’s security is
the proper isolation of traffic between zones, i.e., it is necessary
to guarantee the privacy and integrity of a host’s data while
eliminating unwanted traffic (malicious or not) between hosts,
that can hinder a network’s performance.
A common method of providing this guarantees is to con-
struct modular policies using network slices [19]. A network
slice is a piece of the network that can be programmed
independently from the rest of the network. If we restrict traffic
to a network slice, the behaviour of the entire security policy
is precisely that of that slice alone. So, regardless of how
complex a network’s policy may be, we need consider only
the policy of the slice corresponding to traffic flow between
two zones, to ensure proper traffic isolation between them.
In our revised Zone-Conduit model, a conduit provides this
network-slice behaviour. A conduit policy does not modify
packets intended for another, so to ensure traffic isolation
between two zones, we simply need to consider the policy
of the conduit connecting those zones. For example, in the
policy below, traffic flow from Z1 to Z2 is strictly controlled
by the policy of conduit (Z1,Z2).
Policy Company_policy { Z1 -> Z2 : https, dns;
Z2 -> Z3 : http, ftp, dns;}
So, users from multiple policy subdomains (e.g., corporate
admins, SCADA engineers) can simply manage the policies
of the conduits that corresponds to their subdomain, and have
guarantee of traffic isolation.
V. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
We now describe our auto-configuration system design as
depicted in 2, with the details outlined below:
High-level security policy: The topology-independent policy
input file created using ForestFirewalls. See VI for details.
Compile to intermediate-level (IL) policy: Parses the high-
level policy to an intermediate format for checking.
Network topology: The input network topology described in
the XML-based graph file format GraphML [18]. The file
contains information of all devices of the underlying network
and their interconnections. The crucial aspects are the details
of the topology near the firewalls.
Generate network-level, vendor-neutral policy: Down-
compiles high-level policy to network-level, by coupling pol-
icy to the input network topology. See V-A.
Verify IL policy against best-practices, via Alloy: Formally
checks an IL policy for SCADA best-practice violations and
for correctness. Best-practice checks employ canonicalised
Fig. 2: Firewall auto-configuration process.
policies while a mathematical and logic based tool, Alloy [21],
finds anomalies within the policy. See V-B.
Verify network-level policy via Alloy: Formally checks
network-level policy for correctness via Alloy [21]. See V-B.
Device templates: A vendor and device specific meta-
configurations repository that currently supports UML IP-
Tables, Cisco ASA5505 models, and is easily extensible.
Generate device-level configurations: The rendering of
device-specific configurations for firewalls using the network-
level policy and the device templates.
Verify via emulations: Device configurations are pushed to an
emulated network for pre-deployment testing. Test scripts are
auto-executed in this network, to generate pathological traffic
and validate configurations. See V-C.
Real network: Device-specific configurations are pushed to
hardware in a real network. At present this is conducted
manually3, but we intend to automate it.
Verify via real traffic tests: Automated tests are created for the
real-network, generating real-traffic, to verify post-deployment
behaviour of firewall configurations. See V-C.
A. Network-level policy generation
A high-level policy is implemented on a network by
coupling the policy to the network topology instance. The
resultant network-level ACL rules are vendor/device neutral.
This generic format allows easy checking of rules for incon-
sistencies. The policy generation steps are outlined below.
3Automation of pushing device configurations is more development than
research.
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1) Zone-Conduit model construction: The system first
builds a Zone-Firewall model, containing the disjoint zones
and their firewall interconnections [35] using the network
topology. Additional Firewall-Zones, Abstract-Zones and
Carrier-Zones are added to the model as required.
Next, the network conduits are defined to create the Zone-
Conduit model. The Zone-Conduit model of the input network
may not always match that perceived by the policy creator.
So, we must cross check the real model against that provided
through the specification. If mismatched, an error is reported
indicating incompatibility.
2) Network coupling and rule translation: An implicit
mapping between a zone and its host/subnet composition
is created when defining the zones in the input network.
This mapping readily translates the high-level policy to the
underlying network. The source and destination zone of each
high-level rule can be substituted with the corresponding IP
address ranges from this mapping. The equivalent network
ACL rules can be obtained from the cross product of these
IP address ranges and the original rule operator and service
description. We can represent rule translation through a map-
ping t : Φ→ Γ, where Φ is the high-level policy space and Γ
is the network-level policy space.
Multicast rules may also be required for the correct opera-
tion of certain protocols. For instance, when OSPF is specified
as a dynamic routing protocol by the user, multicast rules
are required to enable neighbour relationships to correctly
form within a single OSPF area. Similarly, stateful protocols
(e.g., TCP) require return path rules in addition to the forward
path rules for correct operation. ForestFirewalls handles these
requirements automatically, generating and incorporating any
supplementary rules as necessary.
3) Path selection and conduit configuration: The system
identifies possible Zone-Conduit communication paths for
each high-level policy rule. Paths that are deemed imprac-
tical are eliminated. For instance, (i) traffic cannot transit a
Firewall-Zone. Firewall-Zones only enable traffic flow to and
from the firewall but cannot forward traffic, (ii) a traffic path
cannot form loops around firewalls. If a path requires a traffic
packet to traverse a particular firewall interface more than
once, it is discarded, (iii) traffic originating from or terminating
at a Firewall-Zone must have a valid external path through the
network.
Our system configures all conduits, using valid paths. A
conduit implements a default deny-all policy between its
interconnecting zones. This strategy promotes defence in depth
[2], [9], which prevents a single point of failure from triggering
cascading security breaches across the network.
The system evaluates each conduit’s firewall-interface lay-
out to determine how the Access Control List (ACL) rules
should be applied on these interfaces (inbound or outbound).
Our high-level policy is easily adapted to incorporate new
zone additions to a network. The updated policy is swiftly
re-implemented on the network to protect the new zones.
B. Formal policy verification
Policy-rule overlaps can cause unintended consequences.
These overlaps can be redundancies or conflicts [27], [42].
Redundant rules can be removed without affecting the seman-
tics of a policy. Such rules reflect configuration inefficiencies.
A conflict occurs when a rule overlaps with preceding rules
but specifies a different action, creating ambiguity. Correct
ordering of rules is typically required to avoid rule conflicts.
Our system only supports positive permissions. So, we
remove conflicts by design, rendering rule order irrelevant.
Redundancies are still possible, so we need to check for these.
We find redundancies using a model checker: Alloy [21].
Formal model-checking is generally complex, so Alloy aims
to find counter-examples to illustrate problems. Essentially it’s
a refuter [21] not a prover. But, its ability to comprehensively
analyse a model, even within finite bounds, makes it very
useful [21]. For Alloy based verification, see VII.
A policy also needs to be checked for SCADA best prac-
tice compliance. Checking policies by exhaustive comparison
would be highly inefficient. A more efficient approach would
be to derive a unique, canonical, representation of each policy.
Policy canonicalisation can be represented through a mapping
c : Φ → Θ, where Θ is the canonical space of policies.
Inclusion and equivalence checks on the canonical policies,
help identify any violations. For details, see VII.
C. Automated testing
We use a network emulator – Netkit – for our pre-deploy-
ment tests. The emulator is open source and enables virtual
devices and interconnections using UML [31]. AutoNetkit is a
tool designed to automate emulated network experimentation
via Netkit [24]. We have extended AutoNetkit, with basic
firewall capabilities, to generate our emulations.
When the emulated network is run, automated tests specific
to the input policy create pathological traffic to verify expected
firewall configuration behaviour. ForestFirewalls uses Expect
– a UNIX scripting and testing utility – to generate these test-
scripts. Expect enables automated interactions with programs
that expose a text terminal interface [26]. Netkit automatically
launches these scripts within its Virtual Machines (VMs),
once the VMs are running. The scripts run sequentially, with
independent outcomes.
Expect test scripts verify that the permits rules in a policy
works correctly (i.e., positive vetting). A permit rule fails if
its observed behaviour is different from that expected. We can
use a result function R, to track what rules fail. For a permit
rule qam with accept packet set A = {s ∈ A | s ≺ m} and a
test-packet sequence s1 ∈ A the result function is
R(qam, s1) =
{
0, if s1 fails for permit rule qam
1, if s1 succeeds for permit rule qam.
(2)
A failed permit rule means its corresponding test packets
are not delivered to the intended destination.
In addition to positive vetting, we need to check that all
other services not explicitly enabled are blocked. This negative
vetting is conducted using automated, exhaustive port-scans
employing nmap and tshark.
The same test-suite can be used in the real network, post
configuration deployment. The tests now generate live-traffic,
verifying expected real-firewall behaviour.
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VI. POLICY SPECIFICATION FRAMEWORK
A useful network policy specification framework should
cater for management-level policy makers as well as com-
petent programmers. Policy makers need to define high-level
policies to meet business goals. Programmers may wish to ex-
tend the framework to add more features. A layered approach
(3) supports both cases.
A. A layered approach
Fig. 3: Policy specification in layers.
Policy definition high-level language: designed primarily for
non-expert users to define services and security policies, it
uses a library of services and security policies in conjunction
with a simple language. The service library consists of Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) well-known services
and the policy library contains common SCADA security poli-
cies, all easily extensible by a non-expert user. The language
syntax and semantics are also intuitively simple for non-expert
users. Informative warnings and errors are returned for fast
debugging. See VI-B.
Class library layer: dedicated to expert Programmers, this
layer features an Object Oriented Programming (OOP) based,
well-defined object hierarchy that consists of rules for con-
structing protocols (e.g., TCP, UDP) and services. Detailed
checking of object specific attributes (e.g., TCP/UDP port
numbers are between 0-65535) are handled by their respective
classes. A direct mapping between the grammar rules and
the Classes makes the library easily extensible, but it is only
intended that expert protocol engineers would extend this.
Most operators would use the higher layer.
High-level language grammar: dedicated to the language
designers, this layer consists of Backus-Naur Form (BNF)
rules that control the language semantics. The grammar in-
cludes basic checking (e.g., argument length, null checks), but
delegates detailed checking to the class library layer. The rules
are static and can only be altered by the language designers
(us). This preserves the original objectives of a high-level
abstraction that is intended to change slowly.
Our layered policy-specification architecture leads to a vendor
and device neutral policy-specification framework. The system
suits naive users, but the framework is easily extensible to cater
for new network applications and protocols.
B. ForestFirewalls high-level language
Simply put, the ForestFirewalls specification language al-
lows a user to instantiate a high-level firewall policy. Below
is the definition (a complete example can be found in VIII).
ForestFirewalls’ parser is currently implemented in Python
and Ply (a lex and yacc implementation for Python). It
translates a ForestFirewalls specification (i.e., a .policyml
file) into its Intermediate Language (IL) representation using
object definitions from the underlying class library, also im-
plemented in Python.
1) Service and Service-group description: A service is
defined using the syntax
service <service-name> {
protocol=<protocol-base>;
<protocol-attributes-list>; }
For example, a custom implementation of HTTP, based on
the above service description format is given by
service custom_http {protocol=tcp;
tcp.dest_port=8080;
comment=‘‘Internal Web’’;}
All unspecified attribute values have defaults assigned (e.g.,
here tcp.source_port=0-65535). Service specific com-
ments are enabled via the comment field. This type of code
documentation allows commentary in the lower tiers to be
auto-generated. The aim is to help document network and
device level firewall rules to avoid the common problem that
rules cannot be deleted because no one remembers why they
exist.
ForestFirewalls prohibits the description of generic services
such as all-TCP or all-IP for several reasons. For one, SCADA
case studies [35] reveal that users exploit generic rules where
possible for convenience, such as allowing all-IP traffic just
to enable EIGRP traffic. However, far more services than
necessary are thus admitted through firewalls.
Secondly, such inherently broad services don’t contribute
towards forming well-defined security policies. They cloud the
ability to accurately see the type of cyber threats a network is
being protected from.
A service can be formally represented by
tuple (Pr, PrA, PrV ) where Pr ∈ Λ; Λ =
{all IP protocol numbers} and PrA ⊂ Υ, P rV ⊂ Π;
Υ = {tcp/udp/icmp etc. protocol attributes} and
Π = {protocol attribute values}.
We use a service-group to bundle services and other
service-groups (i.e., nesting is allowed)
service_group <group-name>{
<service-or-group-list>}
Service-groups provide a level of indirection, so application
protocols used to achieve network functionality (e.g., Web
services) can change without needing policy alterations.
A service-group is really a set SG =
{(Pri, P rAi, P rVi) |Pri ∈ Λ, P rAi ⊂ ΥPrVi ⊂ Π}.
The specification supports set operations: union (,),
intersection (ˆ) and difference (\), so, new service groups
can be constructed by applying these operators on existing
service groups.
The following snippet defines a service-group contain-
ing various example Web services:
service_group Web { http, https, dns }
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2) Zone-group description: A zone-group bundles a set
of zones or other zone-groups and is defined using the syntax
zone_group <group-name> {<zone-or-group-list>}
A zone-group is a as a set of disjoint zones ZG ⊂ Ω
where Ω = {all zones}. Multiple zone-group declarations are
checked for duplicates to minimise code redundancy.
The snippet below describes an example zone-group, de-
picting three_zones: a set of zones in a network which is
made up of 3 disjoint zones.
zone_group three_zones {corp, scada, dmz}
We also allow similar syntax and set operators for defining
groups of TCP/UDP ports or ICMP types.
3) Policy-rule description: A high-level policy rule
can be defined as below with an operator to di-
rect the inter-zone flow explicitly. The end-zones defined
by zone-or-group-name have traffic flow of type
service-or-group-name enabled.
policy_rule <rule-name> {
<first-zone-or-group-name> operator
<second-zone-or-group-name> :
<service-or-group-name> }
where operator == ‘->’ or ‘<->’
For example, the following policy rule models the capabil-
ities of a Corp_ orate_zone with regards to Web traffic
policy_rule corp_web_rule {
Corp_zone -> DMZ : Web}
The above description can be represented as a policy rule qam
with accept packet set A = {s ∈ A | s ≺ m} where predicate
m = (s.hdr.source address in Corp zone ∧ s.hdr.dest
address in DMZ ∧ s.hdr.service == Web).
4) Policy description: A rule_group object is used to
hold one or more security policy rules and can be defined
using the following format
rule_group security_policy {
<rule1>, <rule2>, ... }
A security policy is a set of rules RS = {qami ;mi −
predicate}, each rule has an accept packet set A = {s ∈
A | s ≺ mi}.
Similarly, we can specify firewall reporting policy using a
reporting _rule object [34]
reporting_rule reporting_policy {
<attributes-list>}
A global policy object then encapsulates security policy
with reporting policy [34]
policy <policy-name> { security_policy;
reporting_policy; }
5) ForestFirewalls library file imports: In large industrial
control plants, multiple policy sub-domains exist (e.g., corpo-
rate admins, SCADA engineers, network engineers, different
departments) that set their own policies to be applied to
the network components they own or manage. Namespace
importation facilitates such distributed policy management and
promotes reuse of policy. For instance, we can imagine the ISA
creating a best practice ruleset for SCADA as a baseline for
new installations.
Non-expert programmers may, however, be unfamiliar with
the use of a complex namespace library with many features.
We developed a namespace hierarchy that is simple, yet
provides rich features for managing and reusing namespaces.
ForestFirewalls’ namespace hierarchy consists of generic li-
brary definitions for all users with additional support for cus-
tom namespace creation. This allows to compose distributed
policies into a coherent policy set, free of inconsistencies.
VII. VERIFICATION
Once a high-level policy is parsed by ForestFirewalls, it is
stored in IL code and needs to be checked for SCADA best-
practice violations as well as for correctness.
A. Best-practice compliance
Two policies with different rule sets, can have the same
underlying semantics (i.e., they allow the same set of services
between zones). 4(a) and 4(b) illustrate the idea based on TCP
port filtering of single packets. Each rectangle indicates the
allowed packets of a single rule. Combined, the rules cover
the same set of allowed packets.
Comparing policies exhaustively is highly inefficient. So,
we derive a unique, canonical, representation of each policy
to efficiently compare them. In our canonicalisation mapping
c : Φ → Θ, where Θ is the canonical space of policies, all
equivalent policies of Φ map to a singleton. For pX , pY ∈ Φ,
we note the following (the proof follows the definition)
Lemma 2. Policies pX ≡ pY iff c(pX) = c(pY ).
Thus, comparison is eased by the canonicalisation of poli-
cies. We illustrate the idea using TCP policy rules (4) and
dissect the polygon formed in our example policy into hor-
izontal partitions (Figure 4(c)), using a Rectilinear-Polygon
to Rectangle conversion algorithm [17]. Each partition is
chosen to provably guarantee its uniqueness. Canonical policy
elements are derived by translating each partition back to a
rule and ordering the resulting rule-set uniquely in increasing
IP protocol number and source and destination port numbers.
We find a unique partition quickly rather than a guaranteed
minimal partition. The result is a deterministic, ordered set of
non-overlapping rules.
So, intra-policy verification can be performed by comparing
canonical policy components. For instance
Is c(pZ1→Z2) = c(pSCADA→Corp) ?
Another useful notation, linked to the goal of policy com-
parison, is that policy PA includes policy PB . Particularly
in SCADA networks, the notation helps evaluate whether the
policies are compliant with industry-recommended practices
in [9], [38]. These guidelines specify potentially dangerous
services (e.g., HTTP) that should be prohibited from traversing
inbound and/or outbound from the (protected) SCADA-Zone.
A violation here, means increasing the vulnerability of a
SCADA-Zone to cyber attack. Unlike corporate networks, this
increased exposure could potentially render SCADA systems
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(a) Four rules indicated by (overlapping) rectangles. (b) Five rules producing an equivalent policy to (a). (c) Horizontal partitions of polygon in (a) or (b).
Fig. 4: Canonicalisation of distinct rule sets of the same policy.
unavailable, and cause significant financial loss or at worse
loss of human lives.
We indicate that a policy complies with another if it is more
restrictive and define the following
Definition 3 (Inclusion). A policy pX is included in pY on A
iff pX(s) ∈ {pY (s), φ}, i.e., X either has the same effect as
Y on s, or denies s, for all s ∈ A. We denote inclusion by
pX ⊂ pY .
So, we can now evaluate whether an input policy adheres
to the SCADA best practice policy using an inclusion check
Is pInput ⊂ pBestPractice ?
B. Policy correctness
A partial snippet of the Alloy language specification (i.e.,
.als) file auto-generated by ForestFirewalls for the IL pol-
icy is shown in Figure 8 in the Appendix. It depicts a
formal model with 3 signatures: Service, PolicyRule
and SecurityPolicy. In our initial model, a Service
has the basic members: ip_protocol, source_port,
dest_port and icmp_type. Of these members, only
ip_protocol is mandatory.
A PolicyRule has 4 members: zone1 and zone2 to
capture the zone names, an operator and a single service
element. The global constraints are partially shown (lines
17–27 in Figure 8), requiring the universal set (Univ) of
PolicyRule to comprise entirely of rules in the policy. Univ
of Service must also comprise of PolicyRule services.
Predicates can determine if two given rules or services
overlap (not shown). Service overlaps are found by com-
puting their intersection and testing if the result has members.
String type members (e.g., zone1, zone2) can be directly
compared. PolicyRule overlaps are checked similarly.
A ‘no rule overlaps’ assertion (also not shown) is used
to locate distinct rules with overlapping criteria. If found,
a counter-example is returned, indicating potential inconsis-
tencies in the high-level policy. Counter-examples can be
inspected through Alloy’s GUI to find the underlying cause(s).
Currently, Alloy is itself run manually and output counter-
examples help debug data. We do not auto-correct rules as this
requires human discretion.
When overlaps are absent in the high-level policy, there
should also be none in network-level policy, in theory. But we
cannot simply ‘trust’ our system to always correctly generate
network-level policy. So, we re-check the generated policy for
overlaps and verify the fact.
The Alloy export generated for network policy verification
is similar to the high-level export. The key exception is the
source and destination zone names are now replaced with IP
address ranges in an ACLRule. Additionally, the Service
signature also has members depicting protocol state. We also
define an assertion here to check for ACLRule overlaps.
VIII. A CONCRETE EXAMPLE
We show here a concrete example, illustrating our method-
ology and the prototype system. The example is based on an
actual SCADA case study [35] with the multi-firewall network
configuration shown in 5. Due to security concerns and non-
disclosure agreements, a modified version of the real network
is presented for discussion. Steps have been taken to keep the
core security strategies intact, but details such as IP addresses
are anonymised.
Fig. 5: The SCADA network under study. Corp and SCADA
are the corporate and SCADA subnets while the firewalls are
R1, R2 and GW.
R1 is a Cisco ASA 5505 firewall and R2 and GW are Linux
IPtables firewalls. 5 shows these best already. The subnet
summary is below.
The Corporate network (Corp): Provides access to business
applications and the Internet.
Demilitarised Zone (DMZ): Responsible for enabling con-
nectivity between R1 and R2. The distinct vendor firewalls
provide defence in depth [9] by having different modes of
failure and firewall-software redundancy.
The SCADA network (SCADA): Responsible for providing
networked access to plant equipment.
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Corp and SCADA could accommodate 2,046 and 65,534 hosts
respectively. Corp hosts management workstations, a HTTP
server, a HTTPS server, a FTP server, an Email server, a
syslog server and a DNS server. SCADA has Oracle database
servers, management workstations and a HTTPS server.
A. Policy goals
We consider a simple policy which nonetheless covers many
of the aspects that occur in more complex, real-life SCADA
policies [35]. Its premise is that internal corporate users are
trusted, but are restricted to use safe protocols when accessing
SCADA. External users are allowed access only to content that
is explicitly made public. The policy has these goals:
• Corp hosts can access the Oracle servers and the
HTTPS server in SCADA. They can also access all HTTP,
HTTPS, DNS resources on the Internet.
• SCADA hosts can access Web, Email and DNS servers on
Corp. Additionally, they can perform file transfer using
FTP and HTTP with respective Corp servers.
• Corp’s HTTP, FTP, Email servers are Internet accessible.
• R1, R2 can be managed from Corp using HTTPS and
SSH. R2 can be managed from SCADA using SSH. R1 can
also be managed from R2 using SSH.
• A Syslog server located in Corp stores firewall logs.
• OSPF is enabled across the entire site.
• Firewall reporting is enabled for policy verification.
B. Implementation
A partial snippet of the ForestFirewalls high-level descrip-
tion implementing the above policy goals is depicted in Figure
10 in the Appendix. We start by importing the required library
files containing the predefined lists of IANA well known
services. Next, the Zone-Conduit security model is supplied as
a GraphML file. The zones within this model can be grouped
as necessary (lines 9-15), to simplify the specification process
and increase readability. We also define custom port-groups,
services and service-groups as needed.
A passive mode FTP data service is enabled through the
firewalls (lines 18–20) as it’s the best-practice approach [9],
[38]. Ping is also defined for connectivity tests. High-level
rules are defined to match the policy goals listed earlier. Finally
a policy object is used to hold all the rules (line 48).
C. Procedure and Results
Once the high-level policy is parsed, the corresponding
Alloy export is generated by ForestFirewalls for verification.
Checking the ‘no rule overlaps’ assertion (not shown) returns
a counter-example, indicating potential inconsistencies in the
specification. Upon inspection of the counter-example details
in Alloy (6), we see that rules enabling HTTP services
(ip_protocol=6, dest_port=80) between zones Z3
and Z1, initiate the overlap. The root cause is the web
and file_transfer service-groups in the high-level policy
(lines 22 and 25 in Figure 10), both containing HTTP. Once
Fig. 6: Counter-example thrown by Alloy, indicating a high-
level policy error.
this is rectified (remove HTTP from file_transfer), no
further counter-examples are found by Alloy.
Figure 9 in the Appendix shows the ACL-allocation map
for R1, indicating how ACLs are assigned to the firewall’s
interfaces.
Figure 11 in the Appendix partially shows the generated
vendor-neutral ACL rules. Note the explicit deny all rule
supplementing the explicit permit rules at the end. The step
also outputs the Zone-Firewall and Zone-Conduit models of
the input network as graphical output (7).
The network-level Alloy exports have 828 Service,
ACLRule objects. Assertion checks here yield no counter-
examples.
The device-specific configurations are rendered from the
network-level policy, using vendor and device specific Mako
templates. Mako is a template library written in Python [28],
enabling fast and easy integration into ForestFirewalls.
The device-level configurations generated were first auto-
deployed to a Netkit-based emulated network. Once the Netkit
Virtual Machine (VM)s booted up, the test scripts were run au-
tomatically. The emulation results confirmed that the firewalls
correctly admitted the services explicitly enabled through the
high-level policy. Moreover, automated exhaustive port-scans
using nmap and tshark showed that no additional services were
permitted through the firewalls.
Post emulation testing, the device configurations were de-
ployed to the real-network. Although we aim to automate this
deployment, it is currently done manually as its not seen as
an error-prone step in modern configuration tools [13], [14].
Once deployed, we re-executed the emulation test scripts on
hosts in the various zones of the network. The tests confirmed
that the services enabled by the input policy were passing
across firewalls as expected, and port scans confirmed no
additional services were allowed through.
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(a) Zone-Firewall model. (b) Zone-Conduit model of (a).
Fig. 7: System generated security models of the network.
TABLE I: High-level comparison of Original vs Generated configurations (LoC - Lines of Code).
Type Device-level
LoC
Obsolete-ACL
count
Generic permit-
rule count
Intra-ACL
interaction count
Original case study 2720 2 324 167
ForestFirewalls generated 714 0 0 0
D. Cyber attack mitigation
We have studied firewall configurations from 7 real SCADA
networks to date [35] (including the network discussed), and
found the following serious cyber-security vulnerabilities:
• Insecure protocols enabled through explicit generic rules:
all-TCP, all-UDP and all-IP traffic flow were explicitly
enabled inbound to SCADA, permitting far more services
than necessary. Inherently unsafe protocols such as FTP and
HTTP were thus allowed into SCADA. HTTP for instance,
is known to transport worms and attacks. These generic
rules significantly increased the vulnerability of a SCADA-
Zone to cyber attack.
• Insecure protocols enabled through implicit rules: incor-
rect use of implicit rules such as Cisco security levels
[13] enabled all-IP traffic to flow between Corporate and
SCADA zones, making the latter more prone to cyber attack.
• Direct communication enabled between the SCADA-Zone
and the Internet: allowing so, clearly violated industry best-
practices and significantly elevated the risk of a cyber attack
on the SCADA-Zone.
• Insecure protocols enabled through explicit and implicit-
rule interactions: in some cases, insecure protocols (e.g.,
HTTP) were explicitly disallowed inbound to the SCADA-
Zone, but were then implicitly enabled into the same zone,
exposing the latter to cyber attack.
ForestFirewalls addresses each of the above cyber security
vulnerabilities comprehensively. A comparison of the firewall
configurations observed in the case study discussed and those
those generated by ForestFirewalls are shown in I. It shows
that there are no explicit generic permit rules generated by our
system (i.e., all-TCP, all-UDP or all-IP based rules). Eliminat-
ing these rules prohibits unwanted services from being enabled
implicitly between zones. Additionally, ForestFirewalls only
utilises explicit rules to enable both firewall management and
non-management traffic. So, the use of implicit rules such as
Cisco security levels are removed altogether. Doing so, also
prevents interactions between explicit and implicit rules, so,
one cannot override the other to accidentally enable services.
Also shown in I, there are no redundant ACLs generated by
ForestFirewalls. Each ACL serves a purpose and is assigned to
an active firewall interface. There are also no intra-ACL rule
interactions in the ACLs generated, making these configura-
tions comparatively more efficient.
Our system also formally checks a security policy against
industry best practices for compliance. Any violations are
flagged for the user to resolve and policy compilation stops
until the issues are rectified. The step prevents direct commu-
nication between SCADA and the Internet being enabled.
These are almost obvious consequences of our design
approach but the real firewalls [35] had all of these defects.
Our system only requires 80 high-level LoC (only 41 LoC are
policy specific) to generate 714 device-level LoC to configure
all 3 firewalls in the case study discussed. This high-level
policy with only 80 LoC has replaced 2720 attack and error
prone, inefficient, device-level LoC of the original case study!
In fact for all 7 real SCADA networks we studied, it was
possible to replace their total 7694 firewall-level LoC with
only 271 high-level ForestFirewalls LoC.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The current manual approach to firewall configuration is
complex and error prone. Various firewall vendor tools attempt
to facilitate high-level configuration, but these lack flexibility
in specifying detailed traffic restrictions and do not reduce the
configuration burden.
ForestFirewalls greatly reduces the configuration burden,
and by use of high-level abstraction, templates and graphs,
offers a simple and manageable approach to SCADA fire-
wall configuration. Our system guarantees configuration accu-
racy through stage-wise validations employing SCADA best-
practices, a formal verification tool (Alloy), and emulation
based pre-deployment tests. The system gives users assurance
of the generated device-level configurations delivering the
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expected firewall behaviour prior to deployment. The ability to
configure a group of firewalls at once makes ForestFirewalls
scale at lower cost.
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APPENDIX
Fig. 8: High-level policy verification framework using Alloy
(partially shown)
abstract sig Service {
ip_protocol: some Int,
source_port: set String,
dest_port: set String,
icmp_type: set Int }
abstract sig PolicyRule {
zone1: one String,
zone2: one String,
operator: some Int,
service: one Service }
// Policy definition
one sig SecurityPolicy { rules: some PolicyRule }
// List of global constraints
fact {
// All defined rules are in the policy to check
all r: PolicyRule | r in SecurityPolicy.rules
// Policy rules make up universe of PolicyRule
SecurityPolicy.rules = PolicyRule
// A service belongs to at least one PolicyRule
all s: Service | some r: PolicyRule | s in r.service}
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Fig. 9: ForestFirewalls policy description (partially shown).
// library files
import system.services.iana_services;
import system.services.iana_icmp;
// zone−conduit security topology
load_zone_conduit_model ‘‘zone_conduit.graphml’’
// define zone groups
zone_group all_zones {z1,z2,z3,az1,fwz1,fwz2,fwz3}
zone_group scada_zone { z3 }
zone_group corp_zone { z1 }
zone_group internet_zone { z2 }
zone_group all_firewall_zones { fwz1, fwz2, fwz3 }
zone_group all_internal_zones { all_zones \ internet_zone }
// passive mode FTP using custom port numbers
port_group ftp_data_ports { 24500−24600 }
service ftp_data { protocol=tcp; tcp.dest_port=ftp_data_ports; }
// service groups using standard port numbers
service_group ftp { iana_services.ftp_control, ftp_data }
service_group web { iana_services.http, iana_services.https }
service_group ping { iana_icmp.icmp_echo, iana_icmp.icmp_echo_reply }
service_group dns { iana_services.dns_tcp, iana_services.dns_udp }
service_group file_transfer { iana_services.http, ftp }
// define security policy
policy_rule file_transfer_rule { scada_zone −> corp_zone : file_transfer }
policy_rule ping_rule { corp_zone <−> scada_zone : ping }
policy_rule dns_rule { scada_zone −> corp_zone : dns }
policy_rule web_rule { scada_zone −> corp_zone : web }
rule_group security_policy { file_transfer_rule, ping_rule, dns_rule, web_rule }
// enable policy verification reporting in firewalls
reporting_rule verify_rules{ use_case=verification;
granularity.network={zone_or_group={all_zones}};
granularity.policy={rule_or_group={security_policy}};
granularity.traffic={measurement={counter};
counter_type={connection};};
granularity.temporal={per_hour};
granularity.performance={process};}
// define global policy
policy company_policy { security_policy; verify_rules}
Fig. 10: System generated network-level policy (partially shown, comments are denoted by remark).
INFO Vendor neutral network-level ruleset for ACL: acl_2
remark˜enable corp_zone to scada_zone HTTPS traffic (return path)
permit˜tcp˜from˜10.0.0.16/29˜to˜10.0.0.0/29˜sport˜[443]˜dport˜[‘0-65535’]˜state˜ESTABLISHED˜log
permit˜tcp˜from˜10.0.0.16/29˜to˜10.0.128.4/30˜sport˜[443]˜dport˜[‘0-65535’]˜state˜ESTABLISHED˜log
remark˜enable scada_zone to corp_zone WEB traffic (forward path)
permit˜tcp˜from˜10.0.0.16/29˜to˜10.0.0.0/29˜sport˜[‘0-65535’]˜dport˜[443]˜state˜NEW,ESTABLISHED˜log
permit˜tcp˜from˜10.0.0.16/29˜to˜10.0.128.4/30˜sport˜[‘0-65535’]˜dport˜[80]˜state˜NEW,ESTABLISHED˜log
deny˜ip˜from˜any˜to˜any˜sport˜˜dport˜˜state˜
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